Wednesday, September 23, 2026

Boomer Christianity Is Dying

 Lots of relevant points in here. Example:

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/free-expression/boomer-christianity-is-dying-fast-c468244c?mod=hp_free-expression_topnews_pos1

Boomer Christians are alarmed and bewildered by a return to the faith of centuries past. They forget that the political priorities of their generation emerged from a very unusual historical moment. Their confident worldview was a gift from a different era. And it will, I fear, die with them.

Boomer Christianity Is Dying Fast

That generation’s political priorities were formed by an unusual historical moment. It’s over now.

Louise Perry

ET

Archbishop Sarah Mullally in Canterbury, U.K., on March 25.
Archbishop Sarah Mullally in Canterbury, U.K., on March 25. Photo: Neilv Hall/EPA/Shutterstock

A new costume has appeared on the streets of Britain. When activist Danny Thomas staged an anti-immigration protest in the coastal town of Dover earlier this month, roughly 500 men showed up dressed all in black, their faces concealed. The march was peaceful, but the effect was menacing. Many also wore crucifixes. “Christ is King,” they shouted. This call has become common at such protests, as have public prayer, wooden crosses and flags bearing Christian slogans. In a country where only a tiny minority attend church regularly, the use of Christian symbolism is conspicuous.

The combination of crucifixes and nativism at the Dover protest was jarring for Rose Hudson-Wilkin, the Anglican bishop of Dover. Speaking to the Telegraph, she condemned the protesters’ behavior as “contrary to the gospel, which speaks of love and being welcoming to all. The crucifix, for heaven’s sake, is a symbol of love, compassion, forgiveness.” To her mind, Mr. Thomas’s cause is inherently at odds with Christianity.

This is a common view among church leaders. Last year, an open letter signed by senior clergy in Britain across a range of denominations condemned the “misuse of Christianity” by anti-immigration activists. Condemnations of xenophobia are often paired with expressions of extreme xenophilia, particularly within the Church of England. Sarah Mullally, the archbishop of Canterbury, chose the 25th anniversary of 9/11 to grant an award for interfaith work to a Muslim cleric who’d praised Osama bin Laden (the award was later withdrawn following public outcry). British churches increasingly host iftar ceremonies during Ramadan, and senior politicians have accused clergy of facilitating bogus asylum petitions by immigrants who falsely claim to have converted to Christianity.

Britain isn’t unique. In the U.S., the leaders of Christian denominations have denounced federal immigration enforcement tactics, and Pope Leo marked the 250th anniversary of American independence with a visit to Lampedusa, an entry point to Europe for migrants crossing the Mediterranean. Leo insisted in a letter published the same day that the U.S. has a duty to welcome immigrants.

This hasn’t always been the view of the Catholic Church. Mr. Thomas and his fellow activists are drawn to the imagery of the crusades. Pope Urban II preached the First Crusade in 1095 to a crowd that responded with cries of “Deus vult” or “God wills it.” That phrase is popular among nativists on social media. Which pope is the greater authority on the gospels, Urban or Leo? I don’t know. But a glance at Christian history shows that the current consensus among church leaders hasn’t always been so. Taking the long view, it is by no means a settled position among Christians that nationalism and militarism are “contrary to the gospel,” as Bishop Hudson-Wilkin put it.

The xenophilic position dominant now emerged from a particular historical moment. Pope Leo and Archbishop Mullally are both baby boomers. So are most senior church leaders: in the U.S., the average Catholic bishop is 65½. The church is led by a generation shaped by a set of unique historical circumstances.

Boomers were born in the immediate aftermath of World War II. During their childhood, the view that the war was caused by a mass psychological disturbance, a runaway process of escalating fear and hate, crystallized into a consensus that has reigned ever since. If we’re to avoid such a disaster again, then the solution must be, as the philosopher Karl Popper termed it, an “open society”—a new culture where openness and tolerance would be prized, and any whiff of fascist tendencies in citizens’ thinking would be immediately suppressed.

The emergence of this open society coincided with a tremendous economic boom. On one income, a young man with a blue collar job was newly able to support a family and enjoy a comfortable middle-class lifestyle. In the world the boomers grew up in, a person who made ordinary choices could expect to live a good life. As long as you didn’t do anything disastrous—become a drug addict, go to prison—you would be OK.

Boomers grew up in a high-trust, religious and family-centric culture cultivated by their parents and grandparents. Progressive members of this generation also got to enjoy the rejection of all that once the 1960s swung into gear. They benefited from the old culture and from its destruction. This is a trick that can only be pulled once.

What emerged was a clear political program for the boomer leadership class: Suffer any expense and inconvenience necessary to avoid reliving the 1930s. “Wir schaffen das,” Angela Merkel said of her decision to open Germany’s borders to millions of refugees: “We can take it.” We are a rich and lucky people, after all, and things always work out.

Except when they don’t. Countries that enjoyed long periods of wealth and stability in the late 20th century are now less wealthy and stable. Young people no longer consider it obvious that a surplus is available to be shared with anyone who makes it to Western shores.

Christians are also subject to intergenerational tension, which is why signs are emerging of a political shift within the church. Young men have been moving rightward in recent decades, even as their female peers have been moving leftward. American Christianity is masculinizing, with young believers skewing male, in contrast to the gender skew in previous generations. This will soon become obvious in leadership positions, at least within the Catholic Church, where younger priests are far more conservative than older ones.

A concentration effect is under way. Religious belief is no longer the default. The secularization process has boiled off the most progressive Christians—and particularly the most progressive young women—leaving the church smaller, more devout and more conservative.

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When the boomers pass away, and a new generation assumes leadership positions, political change in the church could be rapid. Last week, a leaked video surfaced of a young French military chaplain addressing paratroopers in a cathedral in the south of France. To applause from the servicemen, Fr. Romain Ghandour poured scorn on leftists and warned against those who would “take the place of our values.” Left-wing presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon—a baby boomer—accused Fr. Ghandour of “preaching the return of the Crusades” and seemed to call for the priest’s imprisonment. The sermon was indeed closer to that of Pope Urban II than Pope Leo XIV.

Boomer Christians are alarmed and bewildered by a return to the faith of centuries past. They forget that the political priorities of their generation emerged from a very unusual historical moment. Their confident worldview was a gift from a different era. And it will, I fear, die with them.

Ms. Perry is a Free Expression columnist at WSJ Opinion.


PEW data on LDS analyzed

 


Billion dollar Frontier AI (Mythos + Astra) analysis on recent pew data on the LDS Cliff Notes Diverging Trends: The church is experiencing significant global institutional growth alongside a sharp decline in domestic youth retention, which dropped from 70% in 2007 to 54% in 2024. The Devotion Paradox: Despite the drop in retention, remaining members exhibit remarkably high levels of devotion and social capital, volunteering at nearly double the national average. Class-Selective Participation: Active membership strongly correlates with education and financial stability, creating a "capacity gradient" where professional households are more likely to sustain the heavy demands of the religion. Administrative Wealth vs. Social Transmission: While the institution has massive financial reserves and is expanding physical infrastructure internationally, this wealth does not automatically solve the localized issue of passing the faith to the next generation in the U.S. Future Outlook: The organization is heading toward "uneven consolidation," balancing a highly durable global administrative structure with a smaller, more intensely committed, and increasingly affluent American core.


(includes video)




Transcript

[0:00] For demographers tracking American religion, one exceptionally resourced institution currently exhibits a sharp divergence between its institutional growth and its intergenerational retention.

[0:12] This chart tracks identity transmission for adults raised in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. In 2007, 70% of those raised in the faith remained members as adults. By 2024, that figure reached 54%. This represents a 16 percentage-point drop in the absolute share of adults staying.


[0:32] Taken in isolation, these figures follow the broader pattern of religious disaffiliation observed across the United States over the last two decades. Yet the same data shows this community significantly outperforming the national average in social capital. Among current members, volunteering rates reach 72%, nearly double the 41% reported by the general U.S. population.

[0:54] This creates a sociological paradox. The institution maintains unusually high levels of internal devotion and mutual trust, even as its ability to pass that identity to the next generation weakens.

[1:07] Common forecasting narratives often emphasize either an inevitable demographic collapse or a sudden religious revival, but the survey data describes a more complex fragmentation of the membership.

[1:20] Analyzing the future of the faith requires identifying the counting errors that often obscure the relationship between commitment and growth. The central requirement for researchers is to stop treating current members and raised members as a single population. Measuring the vitality of a high-demand religion requires separating the communal strength of the people who stayed from the demographic reach of the organization as a whole.

[1:45] A frequent error in religious forecasting is the mixing of U.S. survey data, which relies on self-identification, with the Church’s global administrative records.

[1:54] We can model this using a baseline of 100 adults who were raised in the faith. Based on current retention rates, 54 of those adults remain Latter-day Saints, while 46 identify with a different religion or none at all. Since converts represent about 26% of the current membership, we add approximately 19 people to the 54 who stayed. This creates a total pool of 73 current adults.

[2:15] When observers measure high levels of devotion, they are describing the group of 73. This calculation excludes the 46 people who left, whose lack of participation is no longer reflected in congregational averages.

[2:31] The joint transmission rate is found by multiplying the 54% identity retention by the 71% attendance rate of those who stayed. This yields a 38% share of the original population that both identifies with and actively participates in the faith. This math shows that a highly religious current membership can coexist with a shrinking intergenerational footprint.


[2:51] This raises the question of why the remaining core appears so robust if the overall transmission rate is falling. This chart shows how participation levels correlate with education. Among current members, 86% of those with a college degree attend services weekly, compared to 59% of those without a degree.

[3:11] This pattern suggests a capacity gradient. High-demand religious participation often requires a baseline of predictable time, organizational skills, and financial resources — factors that align with professional education. A selection mechanism is likely at work. Adults with the resources to meet these demands are more likely to stay, while those with less stable schedules or fewer support networks are more likely to exit.

[3:36] The result is class-selective participation. The community’s high averages are maintained as the practical threshold for involvement rises, concentrating the work of the institution into a smaller, highly resourced demographic.

[3:49] Addressing the institution’s trajectory requires separating its administrative growth from its local social durability. Institutional reproduction refers to the ability to maintain global administration and physical infrastructure. This is supported by historical evidence of investment reserves that reached $32 billion by 2018. Social reproduction is the different process of passing on a religious identity and maintaining dense peer networks within local congregations.

[4:16] The church has demonstrated significant administrative success, with 2025 conversion growth exceeding 20% in several world regions, and a continued expansion of temple construction. However, geographic expansion and financial stability do not automatically improve domestic transmission. Large financial reserves can facilitate a comfortable adjustment to demographic shifts, but they cannot replace a missing youth cohort or an exhausted local volunteer base.


[4:41] Evaluating the next two decades requires a conditional framework rather than a single linear prediction. There are four primary pathways: stabilization, global offset, a committed core, and assimilation.

[4:54] Stabilization and assimilation represent the two extremes: either a leveling off of disaffiliation or a continued hollowing out of active participation.

[5:05] Scenario B involves a global offset. In this case, domestic U.S. membership falls, while the institution uses its resources to sustain and expand its international presence.

[5:16] Scenario C involves a committed core. The church retrenches into high-demand, highly resourced congregations, narrowing its overall reach while maintaining intense participation among a selected minority.

[5:29] These pathways are not mutually exclusive and can occur simultaneously across different regions and economic groups. The current data suggests a synthesis of these pathways: a process of uneven consolidation. This points toward a globally durable, financially stable organization, coexisting with a smaller, more devoted, and class-selected American membership.

[5:52] For researchers looking toward 2046, the most significant indicator will not be the total number of administrative units, but the retention of specific age cohorts following recent policy changes. The long-term viability of the community depends on whether participation remains accessible to working-class households, rather than concentrating among a professional elite.

[6:14] The institution possesses the structural resources to navigate the coming decades, though the social composition of those who remain within it is undergoing a shift toward a more selective and affluent demographic.


That matches the post’s own “Cliff Notes”: global institutional growth vs. falling U.S. youth retention, high remaining devotion, class-selective participation, and “uneven consolidation.”







It's hard to take a study done using 565 nationwide members and 316 former members as a large enough sample size. There is interesting data in there, but what nags at me before assuming the conclusions are the gospel truth is who participated and where did Pew find them?



Boomer Christianity Is Dying

 Lots of relevant points in here. Example: https://www.wsj.com/opinion/free-expression/boomer-christianity-is-dying-fast-c468244c?mod=hp_fre...